Archives for August, 2010

High-Frequency Trading

August 31st, 2010

High-frequency trading (HFT) is a means to manage rapid order flow to markets. High-speed computers at an HFT firm can submit thousands of orders at a time to exchanges using special algorithms. These orders are usually cancelled and replaced; it is estimated that only 10% of HFT orders execute.  This phenomenon occurs because HFT systems continually fish for smaller bid/ask spreads that may immediately trigger trades. If no trades are triggered, the order is cancelled. However, if such trades are triggered, the HFT firm jumps in by trading to capture the spread – it buys at the lower ask and simultaneously sells at the higher bid. This only works if both legs are transacted at the same time. Any delay in one leg will allow market prices to adjust to the new spread, and the HFT firm can lose money.  While the potential profit per share is very small (estimated between 1 and 2 tenths of a penny per share), when multiplied by high volumes and frequent executions, HFT can be a sizeable money-maker.

It is estimated that tens of billions in profits are realized annually through HFT. Participants include prime brokers, hedge funds, and independent investment firms. This high-stakes arena has seen brokers such as Goldman Sachs sue former employees for stealing HFT trading algorithms. Competition is so cutthroat that HFT firms actually try to physically place their computers as close as possible to exchanges and alternative trading systems (ATS) to reduce communications latency. Some go even further and pay to have their equipment in the same room as that used by exchange/ATS order-matching computers.  The reason for such heroic order transmission strategies is that a delay as little as 1/1000 of a second can mean the difference between arriving first (and thus executing the trade) or sitting in a queue with an open order.

Besides capturing a tiny profit per share on each successful trade, HFT firms can also generate cash flow via perfectly legal rebates from exchanges in return for the enhanced trading volume. With these incentives, it is not surprising that almost ¾ of U.S. stock trading volume is attributed to HFT programs.

Anything this lucrative can be expected to engender its share of critics. Some worry of increased volatility in response to breaking news.  Others feel that dealers, market makers and specialists cannot compete with customers since the latter group gets first shot at existing bids and asks. That’s because customer have a higher trade priority than do dealers – which actually makes sense since dealers are there to make markets, not monopolize them.  The problem is that the liquidity provided by HFT engines can be quickly withdrawn when news occurs or volatility reaches extremes, thus making the market-makers job much more risky in difficult markets.

HFT, sometimes referred to as black-box trading, would seem to remove the human element from trading. A mistake on the tape can lead to a flurry of HFT activity that can easily disrupt trading operations. If such activity causes rapid discontinuous downside movements, other customers may have any stop-loss orders bypassed and sustain a larger loss than anticipated.  The future of HFT is not clear – it will be interesting to see if the additional liquidity provided by HFT will compensate the trading community for possible downside risks.

Making Dark Pools Less Dark

August 30th, 2010

Dark Pool

Dark pools sound mysterious. But in fact, dark (liquidity) pools are crossing networks (alternative electronic trading systems) offered by prime brokers and others to shield trades from prying eyes. Trades executed via a dark pool are not displayed on order books.  The pool allows institutional investors to move large blocks without tipping off the public as to price, volume or trader.  They are reported as over-the-counter trades on national consolidated tapes.

But the rules governing broker crossing systems (BCS) are set for reform on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), which is responsible for coordinating securities regulation across the continent, published technical advice on 29 July designed to help the European Commission as it gears up for a review of European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). The directive harmonizes financial regulatory policies within the EU. The recommendations included a tightening up of oversight of broker crossing networks, centered on greater post-trade transparency to both regulators and market participants and imposing a limit on the amount of business a BCS can execute before it is required to reclassify as a multilateral trading facility (MTF).

A MTF is a system that brings together third-party buyers and sellers of financial instruments, as specified in the EU’s MiFId. Because they can be assimilated to alternative trading exchanges, they provide an extra source of liquidity and transparency.

In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission has also laid out a three-point plan for reforming dark trading systems, in a bid to shed greater light on dark pool practices. These comprise a need for actionable indications of interest (IOI) sent by dark pools to be published in the same way as actual quotes; lowering the level at which dark pools must make quotes public to 0.25% of a stock’s average daily traded volume from 5%; and forcing dark pools to report trading volumes individually on the consolidated tape. All three proposals included an exemption for orders of $200,000 or more.

Institutional investors that send orders to broker dark pools often feel inadequately informed about how orders are routed, as well as the type of non-client flow that resides in each because of the differences in crossing models and order handling practices used by the sell-side.

In both the US and Europe, ambiguity over the rules that cover broker’s internal crossing mechanisms has left the model open to interpretation, which has led to more buy-side inquiries on how their orders will be handled.

While many broker-operated dark pools seem to match orders similarly, further examination reveals small differences that could affect buy-side execution performance.

For example, UBS, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs all enable access to their dark pools via proprietary algorithms only, which gives them discretion over how orders are handled and prohibits access from non-clients. Furthermore, each firm claims not to disseminate IOIs to third parties such as electronic market makers from their respective pools, which enables them to be completely dark and free, in theory, from information leakage.

However, UBS states that only its client-facing trading businesses are allowed to send flow to the Price Improvement Network (PIN), while Credit Suisse’s Crossfinder and Goldman Sachs’ SIGMA – known as SIGMA X in the US – integrate a wider selection of internal flow into their dark pools.

UBS matches orders in PIN at the midpoint, while Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs execute flow at anywhere within the spread.

Morgan Stanley seeks to differentiate its offering, MS Pool, by stipulating a minimum order size and minimum resting period to facilitate larger crosses compared to displayed markets.

“If a broker has an unusually high crossing rate in their broker crossing system, they may be sending out actionable IOIs and market their flow to electronic market makers,” she said. “High-frequency traders can use this information and execute against client flow, which potentially provides good execution results. But the key is for clients to obtain transparency as to the way their orders are managed and the flow they interact with.”

But Andrew Silverman, managing director, Morgan Stanley, does not think the reform proposals, particularly for IOIs, will bring any more comfort to the buy-side.

“The bottom line is that all firms operating dark pools or broker crossing systems should disclose their order handling practices. If the SEC bans actionable IOIs, those using them can instead use immediate-or-cancel order types to determine the trading interest residing in dark pools,” said Silverman. “US buy-side firms are currently skeptical of how orders are handled by brokers. Any regulation should focus on how to add more transparency to the marketplace.”

Source

Stephen Colangelo at IndieCon

August 27th, 2010

Stephen A. Colangelo Jr.

Stephen A. Colangelo, Jr. is one of the foremost experts on private placements and hedge funds. As the founder and chief executive officer of Start A Hedge Fund, LLC, Stephen teaches investors and entrepreneurs the intricacies of how to leverage hedge funds for big profits, secrets that have made only a handful of savvy investors millions and even billions of dollars through these investment vehicles. Start A Hedge Fund, LLC operates a network of 200 investment and financial websites, and owns 3,000 financial-related domain names in its domain portfolio.

Stephen is an educator, writer and media entrepreneur who is focused on building the first online media, education and value-added service for the hedge fund and private placement industries. Among its services, Start A Hedge Fund, LLC offers private placement consulting services to entrepreneurs and startup companies who want to jumpstart their capital raise endeavors through Regulation D offerings.

Here is Stephen’s recent interview at IndieCon:

Options P&L

August 27th, 2010

An option is a derivative contract that permits, but doesn’t obligate, a trader to buy (a call) or sell (a put) a specific underlying instrument at a specific price. An option contract specifies the following:

  • a type (call or put)
  • the identity and quantity of the underlying security
  • the strike price (the price of the underlying security), which is a floor or ceiling as to whether the contract may be exercised
  • an expiration date

Exchange-traded options (also called “listed options”) have standardized contracts and are settled through a clearing house with fulfillment guaranteed by the credit of the exchange. Since the contracts are standardized, accurate pricing models are often available. Exchange-traded options, which are available from prime brokers, include:

  • stock options
  • commodity options
  • bond options and other interest rate options
  • index (equity) options
  • options on futures contracts

Over-the-counter options (OTC options, also called “dealer options”) are traded between two private parties, and are not listed on an exchange. The terms of an OTC option are unrestricted and may be individually tailored to meet any business need. In general, at least one of the counterparties to an OTC option is a well-capitalized institution. Option types commonly traded over the counter include:

  • interest rate options
  • currency cross-rate options
  • options on swaps (swaptions)

The price of an option consists of two components:

  • Intrinsic value: the difference between the price of the underlying security and the strike price
  • Time value: a calculated amount that decreases with the approach of the expiration date and increases with the difference between the price of the underlying security and the strike price

There are several standard formulas for calculating profits on puts and calls, depending on whether the investor is long or short an option position.  A long holder pays a premium to buy an option; the investor on the short side collects the premium. A warrant is basically a call option, but it can have an longer lifetime than does a call option.

Call Option Calculation

This calculation illustrates that a call option has positive monetary value when the underlying instrument has a spot price (S) above the strike price (K). Since the option will not be exercised unless it is “in-the-money”, the payoff for a call option is

Intrinsic value = max[(S − K);0] or, more formally, (S − K) +

where :

That is, the call’s intrinsic value is the strike price less the spot price.

The profit or loss on the call option is the payoff (if any) on the option less the sum of its intrinsic value and the premium paid:

P&L = payoff – (intrinsic value + premium)

The calculation of an option’s premium is extremely complicated and beyond our scope.

Example

‘Trader A’ (call buyer) purchases a call contract to buy 100 shares of ZZZ Corp from ‘Trader B’ (call writer) at $50/share. The current price is $45/share, and ‘Trader A’ pays a premium of $5/share. If the share price of ZZZ stock rises to $60/share right before expiration, then ‘Trader A’ can exercise the call by buying 100 shares for $5,000 from ‘Trader B’ and sell them at $6,000 in the stock market. In practice, Trader A would simply sell the call to collect the payoff of $1,000, unless Trader A wanted to own the actual shares.

Trader A’s P&L can be calculated as follows:

  • Sale of 100 stock at $60 = $6,000 (payoff)
  • Amount paid to ‘Trader B’ for the 100 stock bought at strike price of $50 = $5,000 (intrinsic value)
  • Call option premium paid to Trader B for buying the contract of 100 shares @ $5/share, excluding commissions = $500 (premium)
  • ‘Trader A’  P&L = payoff – (intrinsic value + premium) = $6,000 − ($5,000 + $500) = $500

Put Option

The buyer of a put option is betting that the underlying will decrease in price. The calculation is analogous to that used for a call option, except:

Intrinsic value = max[(SK);0] or, more formally, (KS) +

where:

That is, the put’s intrinsic value is the spot price less the strike price.

Mellon Pitted Against Cuomo In Response to New York Lawsuit

August 26th, 2010

NY AG Andrew Cuomo

In response to a lawsuit filed by the New York Attorney General, the Bank of New York Mellon insisted Monday that it was not involved in withholding information from clients regarding the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme.

The bank/prime broker’s Ivy Asset Management and two of its executives refuted charges that they misinformed clients about investments tied to convicted Ponzi scheme operator Bernard Madoff and asked a judge to dismiss the claims made by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.

Ivy, BNY Mellon’s New York-based investment adviser, withheld damaging information about Mr. Madoff so the firm could make millions of dollars in fees, Mr. Cuomo said when he sued Ivy in May. He also sued former Ivy CEO Lawrence Simon and ex-Chief Investment Officer Howard Wohl. The complaint was filed in New York State Supreme Court.

In their answers filed Monday, Messrs. Simon and Wohl as well as Ivy asked for a judgment in their favor, dismissal of all claims and payment of legal fees.

The three parties said they “had no duty to disclose the information that the complaint alleges was not disclosed,” the defendants wrote. They also claim they “acted at all times in good faith and without any fraudulent intent.”

From 1998 to 2008, Ivy was paid more than $40 million to give advice and conduct due diligence for clients with large Madoff investments, Mr. Cuomo claims. He said internal e-mails revealed that even after the company learned Mr. Madoff wasn’t investing client funds as promised, Ivy kept silent to keep from losing the fees. Ivy’s clients lost more than $227 million, Mr. Cuomo said.

In the original complaint, Cuomo cited a 1998 document in which ex-CEO Larry Simon rejected Wohl’s recommendation that, because of what Ivy knew about Madoff, the investment adviser should pull its own funds from the scammer because such a move could jeopardize the Madoff fees:

“Amount we now have with Bernie in Ivy’s partnerships is probably less than $5 million. The bigger issue is the 190 mil or so that our relationships have with him which leads to two problems, we are on the legal hook in almost all of the relationships and the fees generated are estimated based on 17+% returns…[to be] $1.275 Million…. Are we prepared to take all the chips off the table, have assets decrease by over $300 million and our overall fees reduced by $1.6 million or more, and, one wonders if we ever “escape” the legal issue of being the asset allocator and introducer, even if we terminate all Madoff related relationships?”

Mr. Simon has released a series of emails that he insists vindicates his position.

Source

A Few Real Estate Agents Benefit from Lehman Brothers Collapse

August 25th, 2010

Time Warner Center

James Nicholson thought he had it all. He managed a popular hedge fund, and had property in New York City, Southampton, Florida and New Jersey. Were it not for the collapse of Lehman Brothers, he still might be lighting his cigars with hundred dollar bills. But the prime broker’s collapse exposed Nicholson’s hedge fund for what it really was: a Ponzi scheme.

Accordingly, the U.S. Marshals service has sold off hedge fund fraudster James Nicholson’s Manhattan pied a terre, for $1.75 million less than he paid for it. The condominium in New York’s Time Warner Center, on Columbus Circle, sold for $6.75 million. Nicholson paid $8.5 million for the apartment in May 2008, just months before his $133 million Ponzi scheme collapsed.

The Time Warner Center sale follows the sale of Nicholson’s Palm Beach, Fla., penthouse and Southampton, N.Y., estate. Nicholson’s Saddle River, N.J., home is under contract, while the fate of the $337,500 Montvale, N.J., condo he bought for his mother-in-law remains uncertain.

Proceeds from the real-estate sales will be returned to Nicholson’s victims, who lost between $7 million and $140 million during his five-year fraud.

Nicholson pleaded guilty to the fraud in December, admitting that he began lying to investors in his Westgate Capital Management hedge fund as far back as 2004. But the meat of the scam didn’t come until the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which in turn precipitated the collapse of Nicholson’s seven hedge funds. In the wake of his losses on the Lehman bankruptcy, Nicholson lied to investors about his returns and how much the funds were managing: He claimed to run $900 million; he actually ran no more than $60 million.

Nicholson’s scam fell apart in December 2008, when $5 million in redemption checks bounced.

He faces up to 45 years in prison when he is sentenced in October.

Source

Futures and Forwards P&L

August 24th, 2010

A futures contract is a standardized contract with the following characteristics:

  • traded on a futures exchange
  • used to buy/sell a standardized quantity of a specified commodity or financial instrument of standardized quality at a certain date in the future
  • at a price (the futures price) determined by supply and demand

The final settlement date is called the delivery date. The official price of the futures contract is set at the end of a day’s trading session on the exchange is called the settlement price.

A futures contract gives the holder the obligation to make or take delivery under the terms of the contract. The seller delivers the underlying asset to the buyer or, if it is a cash-settled futures contract, cash is transferred from the futures trader who sustained a loss to the one who made a profit. To exit the commitment prior to the settlement date, the holder of a futures position has to offset his/her position by either selling a long position or buying back (covering) a short position, effectively closing out the futures position and its contract obligations.

Futures contracts are exchange-traded derivatives. The exchange’s clearinghouse acts as counterparty on all contracts, sets margin requirements, and provides a mechanism for settlement.

Forwards are similar to futures, except they trade over the counter and need not be standardized.

To minimize credit risk to the exchange, traders must post margin, called a performance bond, which is typically 5%-15% of the contract’s value. Initial margin is the money required to open a futures position.  It is a security deposit to ensure that traders have sufficient funds to meet any potential loss from a trade. Brokers can call for the posting of additional margin when a contract loses value. This variation margin is called on a daily basis when the contract is marked to market. However, in times of high volatility a broker can make an intra-day margin call.

Total Equity is the sum of a trading account’s positive or negative cash balance and the gain or loss on the account’s open contract positions in the futures markets. Margin is deposited or returned based upon the total equity in an account.

In the futures market, Unrealized P&L is called open trade equity; it is the marked-to-market value of the open commodity futures positions in a trading account and is expressed as a gain or a loss. P&L is realized when a contract expires or is offset by a contract on the opposite side.

Return on Margin (ROM) represents the gain or loss compared to required margin, and is calculated as (realized return) / (initial margin).

For a simple, non-dividend paying asset, the value of the future/forward, F(t), will be found by compounding the present value S(t) at time t to maturity T by the rate of risk-free return r.

or, with continuous compounding:

The P&L for a futures trade is the price at the opening of the contract less the price at the close.

Financial Services Industry Pondering Impact of Dodd-Frank Act

August 23rd, 2010

Providers of financial services, such as prime brokers, are now calibrating how to respond to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Under review are the Act’s effects on returns, leverage, risk-taking, innovation, and transparency.  That is because the Act drives higher margin requirements and less leverage.  Providers also worry that the threat of increased SEC scrutiny will inhibit certain proprietary strategies favored by hedge funds and other alternative investments.

Private equity and real estate funds are also feeling the heat. For example, Bank of America Merrill Lynch effectively departed the business when it outsourced management of its Asian real estate fund to Blackstone Group in July, said Steven Coyle, chief investment officer of Cohen & Steers’ fund-of-funds management arm, Global Realty Partners, New York.

Anticipating that financial reform would likely make the businesses obsolete was one reason leading to the decision to sell, Mr. Coyle noted. The other was “realizing that recent hits to real estate made these businesses less attractive on an ongoing basis,” he said.  “If they remain as banks, I don’t think they will stay in business,” Mr. Coyle said. “Most investors invested because the house (bank parent to the investment management firm) had a major investment.”

Large non-bank financial institutions may also suffer as investors start to shy away from large investment firms. While “this is not the death knell of large firms,” he said, on balance, investors will move toward a smaller operating model, Mr. Coyle added.

Financial reforms — both in the U.S. and globally — are expected to have the combined effect of making debt, a key ingredient in real estate and private equity investments, even harder to come by.  “There is a concern that, whereas normalcy would return to the debt capital markets, the de-risking (caused by the financial reform law) will cause debt capital markets for real estate to be slower to recover,” said Robert T. O’Brien, real estate leader for New York-based consulting firm Deloitte. “Lending standards will be tighter with more documents, more diligence and with banks having to have more capital reserves.”

With the financial overhaul signed into law, institutional investors and managers now are waiting for the other shoe to drop: that is, the regulatory specifics.

One little-discussed aspect of the so-called Volcker Rule – which restricts banks from proprietary trading – is that it also prohibits financial institutions owning more than 3% of any alternative investment fund.

“Banks cannot buy 3% of a private equity or hedge fund and banks cannot sponsor or operate a fund and invest more than 3%,” said David Sahr, partner in the financial services, regulation and enforcement division at the New York office of law firm Mayer Brown LLP.

This not only applies to funds being raised, but also to any funds — private equity, real estate and hedge funds — the financial institutions now sponsor, said Lennine Occhino, partner in the Chicago headquarters of Mayer Brown.

More widely discussed has been the aspect of the Volcker Rule that banks’ total private equity and hedge fund exposure must not be more than 3% of Tier One capital — banks’ cushion of core capital intended to absorb losses so they won’t cut into deposits, Mr. Sahr said. What’s more, a bank must have a fiduciary relationship with investors and have an existing asset management relationship with investors to sponsor alternative investment funds at all, Mr. Sahr said.

But the rules do not stop there. Even if a financial institution does not own a bank, if the institution is so important to the U.S. economy that it could cause the economy to break down, it could be subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve, he said.

These could include large insurance companies, large private equity and hedge fund firms, large manufacturers or their investment management subsidiaries like General Electric Co.‘s GE Capital. These firms would not be prohibited from owning and sponsoring alternative investment funds; but they would be subject to overall capital limits that have yet to be set by the Federal Reserve, Mr. Sahr said.

“The legislation gives the Federal Reserve the authority to designate non-banks as systemically important financial institutions,” Mr. Kahn said.

Some private investment firms see this as an opportunity to expand their businesses. Many expect to scoop up talented investment executives from large financial services firms or acquire existing investment management units from players departing the business, he said.

Source

Coupon Interest on Syndicated Bank Debt – Part Two

August 20th, 2010

Last time, we began a discussion of coupon interest on syndicated bank debt – we’ll conclude now with additional information on the forms of interest payment available and the types of fees encountered.

Payment-In-Kind (PIK) facilities have virtual interest payments that increase the principal amount of the loan. Interest is cleared similarly to a standard bank loan, but interest is wiped off once the contract matures, and the position is increased by the amount of accrued interest.

The coupon interest rate is typically a floating spread above an index, such as LIBOR. The spread varies with the term of the loan, the credit rating of the borrower, and other factors. There are also fixed rate loans. For both floating and fixed rate loans, interest is charged on the funded portion of revolving loans, and a nominal facility fee (75 to 150 basis points) is charged for the unfunded portion.

A pro-rata tranche is a portion of a syndicated bank loan that is made up of a revolving credit facility and an amortizing term loan, and it is syndicated by banks.  Institutional tranches have the same components at pro-rata tranches, but are syndicated primarily by non-bank lending institutions, such as prime brokers. Both tranches may often be found within the same syndicated loan.  Within a pro-rata tranche, the revolving credit line will typically have the same ending or maturity date as the term loan. By forming a syndicate, banks involved in the deal can spread the credit risks among several lenders. Pro-rata tranches have historically been much larger than institutional tranches in terms of dollar size.

Bank debt often settles on a delayed basis (delayed compensation). For instance, a pro-forma settlement period of 7 days may actually be delayed to 30 days. During the 23 day interim, the borrower is obligated to make the lenders whole with regard to interest accruals. Standard settlements in the U.S. under the LSTA are trade date + 7 and settlements under the European LMA are trade date + 10

Cash trades are ones in which the lender pays out the entire notional amount of the loan in exchange for the full-paid note. Swap trades are total return swaps in which the lender enters into a swap with another counterparty which has purchased the loan and subsequently writes the swap. The counterparty holds the loan, and swap payments are made on a monthly basis. The counterparty charges a swap fee to the lender.

There are several types of fees associated with bank debt:

  • Arrangement fee – received by arranger/agent in return for putting deal together
  • Underwriting fee – price paid by borrower for commitment to obtain financing during syndication
  • Participation fee – received by syndicate participants
  • Facility fee – payable to banks in return for providing facility whether used or not
  • Commitment fee – paid for unused portion of facility to compensate lender for tying up the capital
  • Agency fee – payment for agent bank’s services
  • Prepayment fee – penalty assessed to borrower for prepayment
  • Transfer fee – fee charged by agent bank for transferring a portion of a loan from one lender of record to another lender of record

Coupon Interest on Syndicated Bank Debt – Part One

August 18th, 2010

The market for syndicated bank debt consists of borrowers (corporations or countries issuing debt), lenders (groups of credit-providing banks/institutions) and arrangers (banks and prime brokers that structure and syndicate the debt).  By forming a syndicate, banks involved in a deal can spread the credit risks among several lenders. The debt may have a fixed term (fully funded at initiation or at some future point in time) or may be available on a revolving basis.[1] Bank debt is governed by a credit agreement between the counterparties.  Borrowers with higher credit ratings deal in investment-grade loans, whereas lower-rated borrowers engage in leveraged loans, with correspondingly higher interest rates.

A deal is one overall commitment amount in a single currency distributed among one or more facilities.  It has a stated agreement date and close date, but no stated maturity date. A facility is an individual commitment with unique terms under a deal, specifying a maturity date, a type, and borrowing options. Facilities have one or more contracts that specify terms (number of months, amounts, interest rates, etc.) for portions of the facility. Contracts can be rolled over at the end of their terms.

The maturity date is the date upon which all loans under a facility must be repaid in full:

  • Term loans: typically 5-7 years
  • Revolvers: typically 1-5 years

The expiration date is the date at which availability under the facility expires (i.e. loans can no longer be made).

Bank debt trades as a percent of par and performing loans are quoted clean (i.e. without accrued interest). Nonperforming loans are said to trade dirty. Ownership of debt can be transferred (assigned) to different counterparties, subject to conditions stated in the governing Credit Agreement. Assignment can provide MTM P&L. A credit agreement may give the borrower the right to approve assignees.

Coupon interest is the primary P&L component associated with bank debt facilities. Periodic cash flows from the issuer to the lenders can be composed of principal repayment, interest payments, or a combination of both. An amortization schedule governs principal repayment, but issuers can usually prepay at will (voluntary prepayment).  A unique feature of bank debt paydowns is that they are allocated pro-rata against tax lots instead of on a FIFO basis.  Note that when a bank debt paydown occurs, both the original and current face values are decreased, in contrast to MBS paydowns, in which only the current face value decreases.


[1] There are several other types of bank debt involving credit default swaps and other arrangements.

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